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Foreword: ADR for the Masses 
n 1921, the Oregon Law Review became the first law journal in the 
Pacific Northwest, a distinction resonant with the mythology of the 
explorer—someone whose trail-forging, map-drawing, adventure-
seeking boldness makes further discovery possible.  Students began 
running the Review in 1967;1 since then, student editors have taken 
their pioneering heritage seriously, seeking out and publishing 
 
* Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law.  J.D., Harvard Law School; 
M.A., University of Texas at Austin; A.B., University of Chicago.  Many thanks to the 
Oregon Law Review for allowing me to participate in this Scholarship Series. 
1 About, OR. L. REV., http://law.uoregon.edu/org/olr/about.php?menu=about (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2012).  The Review has published many important and iconoclastic legal 
thinkers.  For a quick look at the wide array of authors who have appeared in the pages of 
the Review, see for example, Alfred T. Goodwin, How the Supreme Court Employs 
Inferior Courts as Messengers, 75 OR. L. REV. 699 (1996); Wayne L. Morse, 
International Justice Through Law, 26 OR. L. REV. 7 (1946); Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Speech, “Professionalism,” 78 OR. L. REV. 385 (1999). 
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groundbreaking scholarship using diverse publication strategies and 
formats. 
In 2011, the Review launched the Scholarship Series, an initiative 
designed to track and highlight emerging trends in the law.  Like a 
themed symposium issue, the Scholarship Series allows editors to 
solicit articles under a common thematic umbrella; unlike a themed 
symposium issue, however, the Scholarship Series avoids common 
issue-specific concerns such as timing constraints, uneven quality of 
submissions, and topic/length balance considerations.  Instead, under 
the Series model, Review editors evaluate whether incoming articles 
are part of the ongoing Series and, if so, label the articles accordingly.  
This strategy allows the Review to monitor a particular scholarly trend 
over a period of time instead of compiling a snapshot of solicited 
research within a single volume.  Articles that receive the Series label 
appear both in the regular volumes and on the OLR website, indexed 
within their applicable Series.  In this way, the Review can timely 
deliver new scholarship while also providing the substantive and 
practical benefits of anthologizing under a common theme. 
The 2012 Scholarship Series, “ADR for the Masses,” begins with 
the present issue and will continue throughout the year.2  The Series 
examines the proliferation of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
processes in large-scale contexts—such as mass torts, environmental 
and public policy decision making, collaborative governance, 
consumer disputes, and organizational dispute systems design—and 
encompasses both post-dispute processes (designed to accompany or 
replace traditional legal approaches to dispute resolution in mass 
contexts) and pre-dispute processes (designed to manage widespread 
or large-scale conflict and disputes earlier and more effectively).  
Sometimes ADR serves as a response or fix to the shortcomings of 
the legal system in situations involving multiple disputants or 
decision makers; sometimes ADR is an upstream strategy for 
managing disputes that, among other things, may render formal legal 
intervention unnecessary; sometimes ADR is a companion piece to 
traditional legal processes, pre- or post-dispute, when managing a 
mass disaster or large-scale dispute or conflict.  The Series is an 
opportunity to identify not only the creative possibilities of these 
 
2 2012 Scholarship Series: ADR for the Masses, OR. L. REV., http://law.uoregon.edu 
/org/olr/scholarshipseries.php?menu=scholarshipseries (last visited Jan. 31, 2012). 
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innovations and hybrids, but also to explore the logistical difficulties 
or ideological tensions that these new developments may present. 
Traditional legal processes are not always suited to large-scale 
disputes, multiple disputants, mass disasters, or public decision 
making.3  Recent Supreme Court decisions tightening up 
requirements around pleading, class actions, and summary judgment 
demonstrate how hard it is to keep the competing concerns of the civil 
law system—docket and other efficiencies, access to justice, and 
responsible regulation of individual and corporate behavior among 
them—in reasonable balance.4  Alternative processes have 
proliferated over the past thirty years in part because they offer extra 
bandwidth to an overloaded legal system through additional upstream 
and concurrent processes, both inside and outside the courthouse.5  
Some disputes still end up in court, but an increasing number of cases 
are diverted into arbitration, court-annexed mediation, hybrid 
mediation-arbitration processes (med-arb), early neutral evaluation, 
and other early case management processes.6  Additionally, 
 
3 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80–81 (2011). 
[T]he constitutional concept of courts as a basic public service provided by 
government is under siege.  Pressures come from the demands imposed by the 
host of new claimants who, because of twentieth-century equality movements, 
gained recognition as rights holders; from institutional defendants arguing the 
overuse of courts and proffering alternatives; and from competition for scarce 
funds in government budgets. 
Id. 
4 In 2007, the Supreme Court moved to a “plausibility” standard of pleading in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and made clear that this standard applied 
to all Rule 8 pleadings in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  The recent case of Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), appears to sharply limit the possible 
use of class actions in workplace bias cases.  Finally, the famous “1986 trilogy” of 
summary judgment cases—Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)—made it considerably easier to “dispos[e] of cases 
short of trial when the district judge feels the plaintiff’s case is not plausible.”  Arthur R. 
Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010). 
5 See, e.g., Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute 
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009) (listing various forms of alternative 
dispute resolution). 
6 See, e.g., Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute 
Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 549 (2008) (suggesting ways for courts to determine and effectuate 
disputants’ preferences in court-connected processes). 
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innovative processes such as dispute systems designs, negotiated 
rulemaking (reg-neg), and collaborative governance through 
multiparty consensus building are helping organizations and 
government offices manage conflict and head off potentially large 
disputes before they ripen into litigation.7  As new dispute contexts 
and challenges emerge, enterprising scholars and practitioners have 
championed the potential of ADR to optimize existing legal and 
political frameworks and provide the elusive “win–win” for 
disputants and the system.8 
Of course, with new processes come new problems, and alternative 
processes are no exception.  Ideally, the Series will illuminate not 
only the possibilities of innovative processes in mass disputes and 
decision making, but also the tensions that such innovation—
particularly when scaled upward—can create.  Court-annexed 
mediation, for example, has not proven as quick or inexpensive as 
initially thought, indicating the need to reconsider the efficiency 
benefits of concurrent ADR processes in legal contexts.9  Government 
agencies, corporations, and other organizations are much more 
enthusiastic about ADR than private individuals appear to be, 
suggesting intriguing questions around the institutional legitimacy of 
 
7 See generally CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, 
DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (1996); WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., 
GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 
(1993).  Organizational dispute systems design often features an ombuds, an employee of 
the organization who addresses complaints from a particular group, such as employees or 
consumers, and provides constructive feedback to the organization.  Carole S. Houk & 
Lauren M. Edelstein, Beyond Apology to Early Non-Judicial Resolution: The MedicOm 
Program as a Patient Safety-Focused Alternative to Malpractice Litigation, 29 HAMLINE 
J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 411 (2008) (advocating within the dispute systems design context for 
the use of medical ombuds/mediator programs to resolve patient and provider disputes and 
medical malpractice claims in a non-adversarial way). 
8 For example, the collaborative law movement has attempted to capture the benefits of 
legal representation while avoiding the downsides of gameplay and litigation-based 
strategies.  In collaborative law arrangements, the parties agree to limit the scope of legal 
representation to creative problem solving and mutually agreeable negotiated outcomes, 
and further agree that should anyone decide to pursue litigation, both attorneys are 
disqualified and the parties must hire new lawyers.  PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE 
LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 9 (2008). 
9 See Shestowsky, supra note 6, at 551 (“Courts often subordinate disputants’ needs to 
the desires of the bench (as well as the bar) to clear dockets and reduce the institutional 
costs of disputes even though empirical studies of court-connected programs suggest that 
they often fail to meet these institutional goals.”). 
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ADR and individual perceptions of justice and due process.10  Efforts 
to regulate mediation practice through licensing and professional 
standards have been controversial, because the qualities that make 
mediation potentially valuable—neutral guidance through informal, 
creative, non-prescriptive, party-driven, flexible solutions—also make 
mediation services difficult to monitor and potentially harmful.11  
Compulsory alternative processes, such as mandatory arbitration and 
early case management, may seem like an enlightened private-
ordering reform of existing public legal processes but also threaten 
the core ADR values of voluntariness and flexibility and accordingly 
may not deliver the benefits generally expected to attend private 
ordering.12  Criticisms that ADR processes perpetuate existing power 
imbalances or foist ethnocentric norms on non-Western peoples 
become even more pressing when thinking about deploying these 
processes to mass audiences.13  Managing the inevitable structural, 
institutional, professional, and ideological tensions that emerge in 
mass ADR contexts, then, is one of the primary challenges of the next 
generation of process designers and policymakers working on mass 
dispute resolution and decision making. 
 
10 See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 988 (2000) (noting 
that “institutional support” for ADR outstrips “voluntary usage,” and suggesting that 
concerns about due process and legitimacy account for this lack of popular adoption of 
ADR). 
11 See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers, and Mediation: 
Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 235 (2002) (examining the overlap between mediation and law practice). 
12 See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1593 (2005) (arguing that compulsory ADR may further disenfranchise structurally weak 
parties).  Moreover, informal ADR processes may divest participants of procedural 
safeguards, perpetuate power imbalances, or overextend state control.  See, e.g., Richard 
Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359. 
13 For a feminist critique of mediation practice, see Trina Grillo, The Mediation 
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1550 (1991).  Grillo 
claims that mandatory mediation “often imposes a rigid orthodoxy as to how [the parties] 
should speak, make decisions, and be.  This orthodoxy is imposed through subtle and not-
so-subtle messages about appropriate conduct and about what may be said in mediation.  It 
is an orthodoxy that often excludes the possibility of the parties' speaking with their 
authentic voices.”  Id.  For a critical perspective on dispute system design methodologies 
and assumptions in mass contexts, see Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, 
Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51 (2009) (suggesting 
that scaling individual dispute resolution models to larger dispute and deal contexts may 
perpetuate existing social inequalities). 
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Consider an example from the work of Ken Feinberg.  Feinberg is 
a mediator who has overseen some of the most high-profile large-
scale compensation cases in American history.14  After the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, Congress appointed Feinberg the special 
master of the Victim Compensation Fund (VCF), tasked with 
determining and distributing awards and, in so doing, avoiding 
ruinous litigation against the airlines.15  In managing the fund, 
Feinberg used a combination of traditional ADR methods (e.g., active 
listening and empathetic treatment as well as broad, inclusive 
definitions of what could be discussed in meetings) and more 
traditional legal frameworks (e.g., damage models using traditional 
tort compensation metrics, such as earning levels).16  Over two years, 
Feinberg awarded almost seven billion dollars from the fund, with 
awards ranging from $500 to $7.9 million.17 
As a claims management system, the VCF succeeded remarkably 
on its goals, compensating more than ninety-five percent of potential 
claimants and significantly limiting the exposure of the airlines.18  
Feinberg’s approach laid the groundwork for post-disaster, pre-
litigation dispute management and arguably led to his continued 
involvement in subsequent high-stakes accountings.19  Even so, at the 
 
14 See Terry Carter, The Master of Disasters, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2011, at 32 (reviewing 
Feinberg’s career and the “Feinberg Way” for dispute resolution in mass contexts). 
15 See FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM 
COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, available at http://www.justice.gov/final_report.pdf. 
16 Feinberg used traditional tort compensation models, taking into account economic 
and non-economic losses, but without punitive damages.  Id. at 3–4.  Additionally, all 
awards were offset by collateral payments from other sources.  Id.  Feinberg described the 
VCF hearings as “exorcisms” for participants seeking not just economic compensation but 
“psychological closure” through the process of showing pictures, sharing memorabilia, 
and telling stories about their lost loved ones.  KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE 
WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 99 
(2005).  These hearings required skills commonly associated with ADR practice.  “No 
lawyer ever receives training for this personal aspect of the practice of law—providing 
what is, essentially, a combination of psychologist's office and confessional.”  Peter T. 
Elikann, Book Review, 90 MASS. L. REV. 48, 48–49 (2006) (reviewing FEINBERG, supra). 
17 See Linda S. Mullenix, The Future of Tort Reform: Possible Lessons from the World 
Trade Center Victim Compensation Fund, 53 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1315 n.3 (2004); Aaron 
Smith, The 9/11 Fund: Putting a Price on Life, CNN MONEY (Sept. 7, 2011, 9:38 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/06/news/economy/911_compensation_fund/index.htm. 
18 See Carter, supra note 14, at 37 (stating that ninety-seven percent of possible 
claimants opted into the VCF). 
19 In 2007, Feinberg oversaw the distribution of $8 million to families involved in the 
Virginia Tech shooting.  Id. at 34.  In 2010, he became the “Pay Czar” for the Obama 
administration, determining compensation for executives at bailed-out corporations, and 
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time many commentators questioned the normative justifications for 
payout disparities based on the income levels of the victims.  Feinberg 
himself, reflecting on the process, openly regretted the traditional 
valuation metrics in determining payouts.  In his view, the ethical and 
moral dimensions of such determinations change dramatically 
depending on the magnitude of the process: 
In the case of Sept. 11, if there is a next time, and Congress again 
decides to award public compensation, I hope the law will declare 
that all life should be treated the same.  Courtrooms, judges, 
lawyers and juries are not the answer when it comes to public 
compensation.  I have resolved my personal conflict and have 
learned a valuable lesson at the same time.  I believe that public 
compensation should avoid financial distinctions which only fuel 
the hurt and grief of the survivors.  I believe all lives should be 
treated the same.20 
Indeed, when Feinberg administered the Virginia Tech fund 
following the 2007 mass shooting at that institution, he successfully 
pressed for a compensation model in which all survivors received the 
same amount.21 
The Feinberg example is illuminating on several levels.  At the 
outset, both the VCF and the Virginia Tech compensation funds 
demonstrate how using alternative processes in mass disaster contexts 
have creative potential (e.g., preserve value, promote closure, avoid 
destructive litigation) as well as destructive potential (e.g., “fuel the 
hurt and grief” with disparate awards).  It is not entirely clear whether 
Feinberg believed that scaling up traditional compensation models 
actually revealed a defect in governing assumptions of the existing 
legal system or simply created a normative distortion experienced 
only in the aggregate.22  This is an important question; but either way, 
the Feinberg experience is evidence of the possibility of process 
change and adaptation, the ability to interrogate established norms 
and then rework a more socially just vision of what those norms 
should be.  Perhaps the greatest promise of “ADR for the Masses” is 
 
currently, he is administering the $20 billion Deepwater Horizon Disaster Victim 
Compensation Fund.  Id. at 37; see also Joe Nocera, Justice, Without the System, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at B1. 
20 Kenneth Feinberg, What Is the Value of a Human Life?, NPR (May 25, 2008), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90760725. 
21 Id. 
22 At first, Feinberg appears to criticize the general legal rule, but then he frames his 
solution in the context of future mass disasters, not in traditional tort scenarios.  See id. 
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that creative, customizable, non-entrenched procedures may lead to 
new dialogues and learning conversations around our governing 
assumptions, thereby creating a space for legal and political reforms 
that seem otherwise unreachable.23 
* * * 
The “ADR for the Masses” Scholarship Series features authors at 
the forefront of groundbreaking scholarship in alternative or 
appropriate dispute resolution, administrative law, and related fields.  
The present volume contains three articles in the series, two from law 
professors and one from a third-year law student.  Each of these 
authors offers useful, nuanced perspectives on some of the most 
important issues in our current business and legal landscape: the 
appropriate devices to curb wrongful corporate activity and to protect 
individual consumers and shareholders.  Society manages corporate 
behavior in part through civil plaintiffs and “private attorneys 
general”24 who bring actions on their own behalf or on behalf of 
others.  Calibrating this plaintiff activity to the correct level of 
regulation is a primary concern of legal procedure, and figuring out 
how ADR processes and values interface with these policy goals and 
these legal rules adds a layer of complexity to the analysis. 
Noted arbitration expert Jean Sternlight opens our Series with a 
trenchant critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.25  Comparing the Concepcion 
decision with a tsunami, Sternlight argues that this latest installment 
in a series of pro-arbitration opinions from the Supreme Court has the 
destructive force of a giant wave sweeping aside state and federal 
efforts to regulate industries, deter corporations from wrongdoing, 
 
23 Modern ADR is characterized by the interplay of utopian idealism—the belief, for 
example, that we can successfully engineer value-creating solutions that benefit all 
participants and employ creative solutions—and the rejection of what is perceived as the 
dystopia of traditional legal processes.  This juxtaposition may make it more difficult for 
ADR to recognize its own dystopian inclinations.  The study of mass ADR processes will 
help illuminate how and when ADR is delivering (or not) on its utopian promises.  See 
Jennifer W. Reynolds, Games, Dystopia, and ADR, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
24 As Professor Bagenstos puts it, “Civil rights laws don’t enforce themselves.”  Samuel 
R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private Attorneys General, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
1459, 1460 (2007).  Congress uses the “private attorneys general” model to encourage 
injured individuals to bring lawsuits and thus provide industry regulation.  Id. at 1461. 
25 Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion Impedes Access to 
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012). 
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and provide access to justice for individuals.26  In Concepcion, the 
Court upheld a class action waiver in an adhesive arbitration 
provision in an AT&T phone contract, even though the relevant state 
law would deem the waiver unconscionable.27  For many 
commentators, the Concepcion decision sounded the death knell for 
class arbitrations, and indeed Sternlight reports that courts have 
already begun enforcing similar waivers against consumers and 
speculates that now that the Court has signaled its willingness to 
uphold class waivers, corporations will have little reason not to 
include these waivers in every contract.28  To the extent that we use 
class devices as a way to regulate industry and to deter corporate 
wrongdoing, Concepcion makes it difficult to follow through on these 
policy mandates in any effective way.29  Considering that state-driven 
reforms are likely preempted and therefore unhelpful, and considering 
that the federal courts appear content to construe arbitrability broadly, 
Professor Sternlight recommends intervention from the federal 
legislative or executive sides, either by passing the Arbitration 
Fairness Act; or by amending the Federal Arbitration Act to disallow 
class waivers; or by creating agency regulation and oversight of 
arbitration in particular sectors.30 
Professor Michael Yelnosky looks at the same issue from a 
different angle, turning his attention to the proper role of state law in 
the arbitration regime.31  The Concepcion case turned on the 
construction of the “savings clause,” which holds written contract 
provisions to arbitration as “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.”32  Yelnosky notes that this provision, under which the 
Concepcions argued for the application of California’s 
unconscionability rules, has long been understood to import state law 
and equity notions into the agreement.33  He argues that this 
traditional reading of the savings clause is dicta and that a more 
 
26 Id. 
27 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
28 Sternlight, supra note 25, at 716–19. 
29 Id. at 724–25. 
30 Id. at 725–26. 
31 Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 
729 (2012). 
32 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
33 Yelnosky, supra note 31, at 733. 
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sensible and historically accurate interpretation would instead 
empower federal courts to generate federal common law around the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements.34  Yelnosky maintains that 
“federalizing” the savings clause will create a more robust, less 
patchwork decisional law around arbitration that will reflect the 
Supreme Court’s preference for arbitration and make agreements 
more predictable and certain.35  Moreover, Yelnosky believes that the 
federal courts already have at least one federal common-law doctrine 
in place that can, especially if developed through the common-
lawmaking process, protect claimants from lopsided or unfair 
agreements.36 
Joseph Barsalona takes yet another angle on corporate regulation 
through mass action, examining the shareholder derivative suit and 
considering how it can be made, through ADR processes, more 
effective.37  He focuses primarily on the demand requirement, an 
early stage in the derivative suit in which the corporation is asked to 
sue itself, as a possible site for improvement of corporate 
governance.38  Barsalona characterizes this provision as “the 
forgotten ADR mechanism available to all litigating shareholders” 
and walks through a proposed change to state corporate codes that 
would clarify the use of this provision and make it more effective as a 
tool of corporate reform.39  Barsalona argues that ADR and mediation 
are effective tools in intracorporate disputes because they prevent 
avoidable value-destroying litigation while still empowering 
shareholders to monitor corporate activity.40  Because the incentives 
of shareholders and directors should be aligned around the 
corporation’s success, ADR provides a smoother bridge than class 
actions to deter wrongful conduct and redress injuries.41 
 
34 Id. at 734. 
35 Id. at 759–70. 
36 This is the “vindication of statutory rights analysis,” under which some federal courts 
have refused to enforce arbitration agreements.  See id. at 761–64. 
37 Joseph Barsalona, Comment, Litigation Supply Should Not Exceed Shareholder ADR 
Demand: How Proper Use of the Demand Requirement in Derivative Suits Can Decrease 
Corporate Litigation, 90 OR. L. REV. 773 (2012). 
38 Id. at 775–76. 
39 Id. at 776. 
40 Id. at 788 (“[T]he demand requirement is unquestionably an ADR mechanism that 
can bring shareholders and companies together to alleviate divisive problems within 
corporations.”). 
41 Id. at 786–87. 
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Each of these articles explores the interrelation of legal 
mechanisms, process innovations, and policy concerns that 
characterizes some of the most pressing issues facing the law today.  
The Oregon Law Review is proud to present these inaugural pieces in 
the 2012 Scholarship Series, “ADR for the Masses,” and invites its 
readers to follow the series over the next several months, both in the 
print issues and in the online collection. 
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